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STRIKING A FAIR BALANCE:  EXTENDED JUVENILE 
JURISDICTION IN NORTH DAKOTA 
JENNIFER ALBAUGH* AND HALEY WAMSTAD** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over fifty percent of states have adopted some form of extended 
juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ).  The purpose of EJJ is to give courts more 
discretion when sentencing a juvenile offender.  Depending on the 
circumstances, a juvenile may receive a juvenile or adult sentence, or both.  
This Article argues the need for North Dakota to adopt some form of EJJ. 
Following a brief introduction, Part II outlines the history and evolution of 
the juvenile justice system.  Three possible EJJ methods are discussed in 
Part III:  voluntary, mandatory, and discretionary transfers.  Part III also 
discusses the process used to transfer a juvenile case and appellate review in 
cases that are appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.  Part IV 
illustrates the modern trend of blended sentencing defining the juvenile-
inclusive, juvenile-exclusive, juvenile contiguous, criminal-inclusive, and 
criminal-exclusive blended sentencing model.  Lastly, Part V discusses the 
development of this proposed bill for EJJ in North Dakota, puts forth a 
recommendation that North Dakota should adopt based on the state models, 
and restates the necessity for a change in the Juvenile Court Act to include a 
form of EJJ. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Juvenile courts were established to insulate juvenile offenders from the 
punishment aspect focused on in adult courts, to promote rehabilitation, and 
to eliminate the stigma associated with having a criminal conviction on 
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their record, by characterizing such actions as delinquent rather than 
criminal.1  The distinct and separate mechanism of juvenile courts 
represents the nation’s belief that juvenile offenders are different than adult 
offenders and therefore should be treated differently, namely in the areas of 
accountability and punishment.2  At its inception, the juvenile justice 
system focused on rehabilitating juvenile offenders, believing that with the 
proper treatment, juvenile offenders could be turned into productive 
members of society.3 
In recent years, however, the juvenile justice system has come under 
attack for its leniency when sentencing violent juvenile offenders.  With an 
increase in juvenile crime, the public has demanded the juvenile justice 
system get tougher in its punishments.4  The original goals of the juvenile 
justice system failed to completely materialize, forcing the juvenile justice 
system to change its approach and take a retributivist turn.5  Instead of 
protecting juvenile offenders, the juvenile justice system now focuses on 
protecting society from juvenile offenders incapable of being rehabilitated.6 
In making this change, legislators and politicians are responding by 
proposing various pieces of innovative legislative action to reform the 
juvenile justice system.7  The most popular of the differing propositions 
consists of five different models and is collectively called blended 
sentencing.8  Overall, blended sentencing focuses on balancing the 
harshness of adult criminal sentences and the imposition of a less restrictive 
juvenile placement.  Blended sentencing provides a viable avenue to 
restructure the presently troubled juvenile justice system. 
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the need for North Dakota 
to adopt some form of extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ).  Part II outlines 
the history and evolution of the juvenile justice system, indicating a shift by 
juvenile courts away from the theory of rehabilitation to the theory of 
retributivism after an increase in juvenile violence.  The Juvenile Court Act 
 
1. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693-94 
(1991). 
2. Id. 
3. Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable:  Reforming America’s “Juvenile 
Injustice System,” 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 909-11 (1995). 
4. See generally Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting 
Tough:  Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 
1303-04 (1996). 
5. Feld, supra note 1, at 695-96, 701. 
6. See id. at 723-24. 
7. NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS:  AN UPDATED ANALYSIS 
OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORM 2 (2008), available at http://www.modelsforchange net/publications/181. 
8. Brandi Miles Moore, Blended Sentencing for Juveniles:  The Creation of a Third Criminal 
Justice System?, 22 J. JUV. L. 126, 131 (2002). 
          
142 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:139 
in North Dakota allows a juvenile case to be transferred to adult court 
through three different methods, as discussed in Part III.  Part III also 
discusses the process used to transfer a juvenile case and the appellate 
review in the cases that are appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.  
Part IV illustrates the modern trend of blended sentencing defining the 
juvenile-inclusive, juvenile-exclusive, juvenile contiguous, criminal-
inclusive, and criminal-exclusive blended sentencing model, which are the 
five different models used today.  North Dakota currently does not have 
EJJ; however, a proposed bill will be presented to the North Dakota 
Legislature in the current session.  Lastly, Part V discusses the development 
of this proposed bill and policy considerations, sets forth a recommendation 
that North Dakota should adopt, in line with twenty-six other states, some 
form of a blended sentencing model, and reiterates the need for a change in 
North Dakota’s Juvenile Court Act to include a form of EJJ. 
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Even the English common law recognized that juvenile offenders were 
a distinct and unique part of the population.9  Prior to the separation of 
juvenile and adult courts, juveniles were prosecuted in much the same way 
as adults.10  As part of the Progressive Era, separate juvenile courts were 
formed.11  Progressives operated under the belief that adolescents could not 
be held morally accountable for their actions.12  This belief supported the 
emerging view that juvenile criminals should be treated differently than 
adult criminals, because they were different.13 
 
9. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS:  THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137-63 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
10. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Criminal Law:  “Owing to the Extreme Youth 
of the Accused:”  The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 641, 645-46 (2002); see also Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage:  An Analysis of 
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2429-36 (1996) (discussing 
how the juvenile court system has evolved over time).  Children under the age of seven were 
immune from prosecution based on the infancy defense, because the law presumed they were 
incapable of forming criminal intent.  This presumption also applied to children between the ages 
of seven and fourteen; however, the presumption could be rebutted.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 511-12 (5th ed. 2010). 
11. PLATT, supra note 9, at 10-11.  Illinois was the first state to form a juvenile court, due 
largely to the work of the Chicago Women’s Club.  ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL 
CHILDREN:  WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA 
AMERICA 19-21, 166 (1998). 
12. RICHARD LAWRENCE & CRAIG HEMMENS, JUVENILE JUSTICE 24 (2008). 
13. Feld, supra note 1, at 693-94. 
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By 1925, forty-eight states had created separate court systems for 
juveniles designed specifically for dealing with children.14  The court in 
juvenile court proceedings played a different role compared to the court’s 
role in adult proceedings.15  This role overlapped with the rise of 
developmental psychology, which began at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.16  “Developmental psychologists postulated that the ‘condition’ 
underlying delinquent juvenile behavior was poor parenting and other social 
ills.”17 
The ultimate goal of the juvenile court system was to treat and 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.18  To meet this goal juvenile courts would 
inquire into the “crime and the criminal,” and this inquiry closely resembled 
the research being done in developmental psychology.19  Juvenile criminals 
were viewed as more malleable than adult criminals and, therefore, were 
capable of being rehabilitated.20  Rehabilitation was accomplished through 
individual assessment and treatment of the juvenile offender.21 
A. THE ISSUES WITH FOCUSING SOLELY ON REHABILITATION 
Although the establishment of juvenile court systems was in its 
infancy, the dissatisfaction grew quickly.22  The major source of this 
dissatisfaction was due to the wide discretion judges retained in 
sentencing.23  There was not only dissatisfaction with the sentences that 
juveniles were being given, but also with the inability of juvenile courts to 
 
14. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:  
1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86 (1999).  Maine and Wyoming were the only two states that did not 
have a separate juvenile court system.  David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in 
the Early Twentieth Century:  Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). 
15. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 86. 
16. Emily A. Polacheck, Juvenile Transfer:  From “Get Better” to “Get Tough” and Where 
We Go from Here, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162, 1166 (2009). 
17. Id. at 1166.  The idea of Parens Patriae was established by the belief that social ills could 
be cured.  Id. 
18. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 86-87.  In the beginning, juvenile delinquency 
was seen as a disease that could be cured with the proper treatment.  Rossum, supra note 3, at 
909-11. 
19. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167. 
20. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some:  Why the Juvenile Court Does Not 
Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998). 
21. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167. 
22. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88; see also W. Don Reader, They Grow Up 
So Fast:  When Juveniles Commit Adult Crimes:  The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. 
REV. 477, 480 (1996). 
23. See Reader, supra note 22, at 480; see also Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167.  Judges 
were given wide discretion in sentencing, because the goal was to fit the punishment to the 
individual juvenile offender.  Id. 
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effectively and properly adjudicate juvenile claims.24  This was due 
primarily to the vast number of juvenile cases.25  The goal of rehabilitation 
was not being met, because juveniles were either sent to large institutions 
that were ill prepared in giving individualized treatment or were given a 
sentence with little or no effect.26 
The decision of Kent v. United States27 directly criticized the 
inadequacies of the juvenile court system.28  In 1961, Morris Kent, at 
sixteen years of age, was arrested for housebreaking, robbery, and rape.29  
Although Kent was a juvenile, the juvenile court judge transferred his 
proceeding, without a hearing, to the U.S. District Court for the District 
Court of Columbia.30  Kent was sentenced to thirty to ninety years in prison 
after a jury trial found him guilty on six counts of housebreaking and 
robbery.31  Kent appealed and alleged numerous grounds for reversal of his 
conviction, specifically citing the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.32  
The United States Supreme Court held that Kent was denied proper 
procedural safeguards.33  Additionally, the Court noted that the juvenile 
court’s latitude in deciding whether or not to waive jurisdiction is not 
absolute.34  The Court decided that in order for a valid waiver to exist, the 
petitioner was entitled to a hearing and access to the juvenile court records 
that the judge had considered.35 
Kent is considered a central case to the juvenile court system, because 
the Court not only questioned the capabilities of the juvenile court system, 
but also criticized it.36  In addition, the Court recognized in certain 
circumstances waivers of juvenile crimes into adult court were 
 
24. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88; Erik K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or 
Billy the Kid:  An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 377-78 (1998). 
25. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88. 
26. Id. at 87. 
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
28. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56. 
29. Id. at 543.  Kent was a prior juvenile offender.  Id.  Fingerprints at the crime scene 
matched those of Kent.  Id. at 551. 
30. Id. at 546. 
31. Id. at 550. 
32. Id. at 548, 551. 
33. Id. at 563.  The Court found both the court of appeals and district court erred in 
sustaining the validity of the waiver, and remanded for a de novo district court hearing.  Id. 
34. Id. at 552-53. 
35. Id. at 557.  In Kent, the United States Supreme Court presumed that the District Court 
examined not only probation reports, but also social records or other similar reports.  Id. at 555. 
36. See id. at 555-56 (“There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of 
the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as 
representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged 
with law violation.”). 
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appropriate.37  Secondly, the Court illustrated guidelines juvenile court 
judges should use when determining whether or not to waive jurisdiction of 
a juvenile proceeding.38 
B. REEVALUATING JUVENILE COURTS BY SHIFTING THE FOCUS 
 FROM REHABILITATION TO RETRIBUTION 
Following the decision in Kent, there was a shift in the attitudes of 
Americans and those involved in the juvenile justice system.39  The 
attitudes began to focus less on the rehabilitation of juveniles and more on 
the retributive aspect of the criminal justice system.40  Retributivism is a 
theory that supports an adult criminal sentence, by putting more focus on 
punishing defendants and protecting the public rather than rehabilitating 
them.41  During the 1960s and 1970s, baby boomers reached their “crime 
prone” years, which caused the unsubstantiated belief that juvenile crime 
was more common.42 
 
37. Id. at 551-54. 
38. Id. at 566-67.  The Court enumerated eight factors juvenile courts should consider when 
deciding if jurisdictional waiver is appropriate.  The eight factors included the following: 
1.  The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection 
of the community requires waiver. 
2.  Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated 
or willful manner. 
3.  Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight 
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted. 
4.  The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which 
a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by 
consultation with the United States Attorney). 
5.  The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 
6.  The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of 
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living. 
7.  The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with 
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other 
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile 
institutions. 
8.  The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable 
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by 
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court. 
Id. 
39. Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing:  A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex Offenders, 19 
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 379, 388 (2005). 
40. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 88. 
41. IAN MARSH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHIES, THEORIES AND 
PRACTICE 12-17 (2004). 
42. DAVID L. MYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN:  TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS 
ADULTS 4 (2005). 
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However, between 1974 and 1981, juvenile delinquency rates did 
rise.43  This increase continued steadily through the mid 1990s.44  Just as 
the level and severity of juvenile violence began to catch the attention of 
society and the politics, the juvenile crime rates started to decrease.45  
Regardless of this decrease in juvenile crime rates, there were a few horrific 
and highly publicized crimes that created the new term “super-predator.”46  
New measures focused on getting tough on juvenile crime emerged as a 
result of the public’s and legislature’s belief that juvenile crime was not 
only on the rise, but was getting more violent and horrific.47 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota has traditionally had a relatively low crime rate.  
However, North Dakota began to get tough on juvenile crime over the span 
of several decades, following a national trend.  Much of the focus in North 
Dakota was on a fear of increasing violent crime and serious crime, similar 
to the fears expressed by other states.48 
North Dakota’s Uniform Juvenile Court Act was established in 1969 in 
response to the Kent and Gault decisions issued by the United State’s 
Supreme Court.49  This change in North Dakota’s juvenile justice provided 
for certain procedural safeguards for juveniles.50  At the time of the 
enactment of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, there was no option for a 
child to voluntarily transfer the child’s offense to adult court, nor was there 
the option to automatically transfer certain offenses.51  But rather, the law 
provided for transfer of a delinquency offense if the court found that the 
child was “not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile.”52 
 
43. Polachek, supra note 16, at 1169. 
44. Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be 
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime?  A State-by-State Assessment, 
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 785 (2000). 
45. Caballero, supra note 39, at 389. 
46. Id. at 389-99.  “A superpredator is thought to have no social conscience, to exhibit 
extremely violent behavior, and to be beyond the control of the juvenile court system.”  Id.; see 
Polachek, supra note 16, at 1169 (discussing the increased media attention juvenile crimes 
received even though juvenile crime rates had gone down). 
47. See infra Part.III-IV. 
48. Hearing on S.B. 2264 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. 2 (N.D. 
1995) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 2264] (testimony of Governor Schaeffer stating that North 
Dakota is one of the safest states in the nation and S.B. 2264 will help to “maintain the security we 
now cherish”). 
49. See In re J.A.G., 552 N.W.2d 318, 324 (N.D. 1960). 
50. 1969 N.D. Laws 547-48, 555-64. 
51. Id. at 569. 
52. Id.  The option allowing a child to voluntarily transfer an offense to adult court was 
provided through an amendment to the Act in 1975.  1975 N.D. Laws 831-32. 
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In 1995, a Juvenile Justice Task Force (“Task Force”) was created in 
response to an increase in violent juvenile crime in North Dakota.53  The 
Task Force completed a study, which reported that juvenile arrests and 
referral numbers had increased and that violent assaults and sexual crimes 
had become a larger portion of the juvenile crimes committed in this state.54  
In an effort to curb this increase, the Task Force recommended legislation, 
which eased the State’s burden in transferring serious, violent crimes and 
habitual offenders to adult court.55  The legislation provided for certain 
serious, violent offenses to be mandatorily transferred to adult court on a 
finding of probable cause.56  The legislation further provided criteria to 
consider in determining whether a child is amenable to treatment in juvenile 
court, which is relevant to a discretionary transfer.57 
Under North Dakota’s current law, there are three methods a juvenile 
case can be transferred to district court for prosecution as a criminal 
offense.58  These three methods are as follows:  voluntary transfer, 
mandatory transfer, or discretionary transfer.59  The method that is used is 
dependent on the specific offense charged and the circumstances 
surrounding the child’s prior involvement with juvenile court.60  This 
Article will review each type of transfer individually. 
A. VOLUNTARY TRANSFER 
A child charged with a delinquent offense may voluntarily transfer a 
case to district court for prosecution.61  The child, however, must be sixteen 
years of age or older to do so.62  This transfer applies regardless of the 
 
53. In re M.W., 2009 ND 55, ¶ 9, 764 N.W.2d 185, 188 (citing the report “Juvenile Justice in 
North Dakota:  Building On Our Strengths”). 
54. Id.  The concern was also related to an increase in criminal street gangs.  Hearing on S.B. 
2264, supra note 48, at 1. 
55. In re M.W., ¶ 10. 
56. 1995 N.D. Laws 422-24.  The automatic transfer provision was again amended in 1997 to 
broaden the scope of offenses to be transferred upon a finding of probable cause for certain drug 
offenses.  1997 N.D. Laws 267.  This expansion in the law was made due to a concern for 
increased gang activity and that some gang members use juveniles to sell drugs since juveniles 
generally receive lighter penalties than adults.  Hearing on S.B. 1306 Before the H. Judiciary 
Comm., 55th Legis. Assemb. 3 (N.D. 1997). 
57. Id. 
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 2011). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(a). 
62. Id. 
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offense charged so long as it is a delinquent offense and not an unruly 
offense.63 
B. MANDATORY TRANSFER 
For certain enumerated offenses, the juvenile court is mandated to 
transfer the case to district court for prosecution as a criminal offense if the 
child is fourteen years of age or older at the time the offense was 
committed, and there is probable cause to believe the offense was 
committed.64  The offenses that qualify for the mandatory transfer are as 
follows: 
[M]urder or attempted murder; gross sexual imposition65 or the 
attempted gross sexual imposition of a victim by forced or by 
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or 
the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
manufacture or deliver a controlled substance in violation of 
subdivision a or b of subsection 1 of section 19-03.1-23, except for 
the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
manufacture or deliver marijuana in an amount less than one 
pound [.45 kilogram]; or the gratuitous delivery of a controlled 
substance not a narcotic drug or methamphetamine which is a 
singular and isolated event involving an amount of controlled 
substance sufficient solely for a single personal use.66 
If there is probable cause to believe the child committed one of these 
offenses, the court must transfer the offense to district court for prosecution 
as a criminal offense, regardless of the child’s juvenile court record, the 
circumstances of the offense, or the child’s likelihood of rehabilitation in 
 
63. Id.  An “unruly child” is one who has committed a status offense, such as truancy, 
absenting, or any other offense applicable only to a child.  Id. § 27-20-02(19).  A delinquent act, 
on the other hand, is one that would be a crime under the law if committed by an adult.  Id. § 27-
20-02(6). 
64. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(b). 
65. For purposes of the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition, the threats need not be directed 
at the victim, but rather the threats may be directed at any human being.  In re R.A., 2011 ND 119, 
¶ 25-27, 799 N.W.2d 332, 339.  Additionally, the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition may only be 
transferred if there is probable cause to believe that offense was committed by force or by threat of 
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.  In re M.W., 2009 ND 55, ¶ 12, 764 N.W.2d 
185, 189.  In In re M.W., the State argued that the phrase “by force or by threat of imminent death, 
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping” modified only attempted Gross Sexual Imposition.  Id. 
66. Id.  The phrase “by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping” not only applies to attempted gross sexual imposition, but also to the offense of gross 
sexual imposition.  Id.  The legislature intended to target certain serious, violent offenses for 
mandatory transfer to adult court upon a finding a probable cause.  Id. 
          
2012] EXTENDED JUVENILE JURISDICTION 149 
juvenile court.67  In determining if there is probable cause to believe the 
child committed the alleged offense, the court may consider hearsay or 
other evidence not ordinarily admissible at a hearing on the merits of the 
offense.68 
C. DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER 
Under certain circumstances, the juvenile court can transfer an offense 
for prosecution as a criminal offense.  If there are reasonable grounds to 
believe the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation in juvenile 
court.69  For this type of transfer, the child must be fourteen years of age or 
more at the time of the offense.70 
In order to transfer the offense under this provision, the court must 
make the following findings, based on reasonable grounds:  (1) the child 
committed the delinquent act alleged; (2) the child is not amenable to 
treatment or rehabilitation through juvenile court programs; (3) the child is 
not treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded or ill; and (4) the 
interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal 
restraint or discipline.71  “Reasonable cause” is defined as “probable 
cause.”72  In order to determine if a child is amenable to treatment through 
juvenile court programs, the court shall consider factors, such as the child’s 
age, maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, juvenile court record, prior 
attempts to treat and rehabilitate through juvenile court programs, and the 
nature and circumstances of the offense.73 
The burden to prove whether a child is amenable to treatment or 
rehabilitation is on the state, except if the offense involves certain serious, 
violent offenses listed in the statute.74  For these enumerated offenses, the 
 
67. Id.  “Probable cause,” for purposes of the transfer statute, is met if “there is a definite 
probability based on substantial evidence the offense has been committed.”  In re L.A.G., 1999 
ND 219, ¶ 11, 602 N.W.2d 516, 520.  “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. 
68. N.D. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).  The transfer hearing in juvenile court is “equivalent to a 
preliminary examination in a criminal case, with relaxed standards for admission of 
evidence . . . .”  In re L.A.G.,¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d at 519. 
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(c) (Supp. 2011). 
70. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(1).  If the child is fourteen or fifteen years of age, the court must 
make a finding that the child committed a delinquent act involving the infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm.  Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(e). 
71. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4). 
72. In re A.E., 1997 ND 9, ¶ 5, 559 N.W.2d 215, 216-17. 
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(3). 
74. Id. § 27-20-34(2).  The burden to prove the child is amenable to treatment or 
rehabilitation is on the child if the offense alleged is: 
manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery, arson involving an inhabited structure, or 
escape involving the use of a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon 
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burden is on the child to prove that the child is amendable to treatment and 
rehabilitation in juvenile court.75 
D. THE PROCESS TO TRANSFER AN OFFENSE 
Under the current law, the juvenile court must determine if the case 
should be handled in juvenile or adult court prior to an adjudication of the 
case on the merits.76  Typically, for purposes of a discretionary or 
mandatory transfer, a transfer hearing is held to determine if there is 
probable cause for the offense or if the child is amenable to treatment in 
juvenile court.  A transfer hearing is similar to a preliminary hearing in a 
criminal case, where the purpose is not to determine guilt or innocence.77  
The juvenile court need not ferret through conflicting evidence or make 
credibility determinations at the transfer hearing, unless the testimony is 
implausible or incredible.78  But rather, the credibility determination is left 
as a question of fact for the finder of fact.79 
A juvenile transfer hearing does not provide the same protections as a 
criminal trial, but it is a “critically important” proceeding and must provide 
the juvenile with the basic protections of due process and fairness.80  The 
constitutional right to confrontation of a witness does not apply at a transfer 
hearing, but rather, is a trial right.81  A transfer hearing is not an 
adjudication on the merits, but rather is considered a preliminary 
proceeding.82 
The standard for admission of evidence is relaxed at a transfer 
hearing.83  The Rules of Evidence do not apply, except the rules regarding 
privileges.84  Merely because evidence has been admitted at a transfer 
hearing, the child is not precluded from seeking to suppress inadmissible 
 
or in cases in which the alleged delinquent act involves an offense which if committed 
by an adult would be a felony and the child has two or more previous delinquency 
adjudications for offenses which would be a felony if committed by an adult. 
Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. § 27-20-34(1) (stating the court shall transfer the case “before hearing the petition on 
its merits”). 
77. In re R.A., 2011 ND 119, ¶ 21, 799 N.W.2d 332, 338. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 30, 799 N.W.2d at 340 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-62 (1966); 
In re K.G., 295 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1980)). 
81. Id. 
82. State v. Woodrow, 2011 ND 192, ¶ 13-14, 803 N.W.2d 572, 576-77. 
83. In re L.A.G., 1999 ND 219, ¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d 516, 519. 
84. N.D. R. EVID. 1101; see also In re R.A., ¶ 10, 799 N.W.2d at 336; In re L.A.G., ¶ 9, 602 
N.W.2d at 519. 
          
2012] EXTENDED JUVENILE JURISDICTION 151 
evidence at the adjudication stage of the proceedings.85  Once an offense 
has been transferred to district court and that offense has resulted in the 
conviction of a crime, any future offense with respect to that same child is 
prosecuted in adult court.86  Once the child has been convicted of the 
offense in adult court, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over that child is 
terminated with respect to any future offense the child may commit, even if 
the child is still a juvenile.87 
For an offense committed by a juvenile, but not adjudicated until after 
the child has reached twenty years of age, the offender can be prosecuted 
for the criminal offense in district court without the need for a transfer 
hearing.88  Under these circumstances, the district court has original and 
exclusive jurisdiction.89  The prosecution after the offenders twentieth 
birthday, however, cannot be an intentional delay by the State in order to 
avoid juvenile court jurisdiction.90  Two prior transfer hearings, which were 
subsequently appealed and reversed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is 
not considered an intentional delay by the prosecution.91 
E. APPELLATE REVIEW 
An aggrieved party may appeal a transfer order to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.92  The court reviews a transfer order under a clearly 
erroneous standard of review.93  The appellate court will give “due 
regard . . . to the opportunity of the juvenile court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses.”94  The court has also stated that the review of a juvenile 
court’s order is similar to a de novo standard of review in that the court 
independently reviews the evidence.95 
 
85. In re L.A.G., ¶ 9. 
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4) (Supp. 2011). 
87. Id. § 27-20-34(5). 
88. Id. § 27-20-34(8).  Juvenile court jurisdictions extends only until the child reaches age 
twenty.  See id. § 27-20-02(4)(b) (defining “child” as a person “under the age of twenty years with 
respect to a delinquent act committed while under the age of eighteen years”); Id. § 27-20-31 
(referencing dispositional options for a delinquent child). 
89. State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 2, 780 N.W.2d 663, 664. 
90. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(8). 
91. State v. Woodrow, 2011 ND 192, ¶ 16, 803 N.W.2d 572, 577.  In Woodrow, the State did 
not intentionally delay the prosecution when the State initially charged the defendant in juvenile 
court, attempted to transfer the offenses pursuant to section 27-20-34(1)(b) and (1)(c)(4), then 
filed charges in district court pursuant to section 27-20-34(8) once the child turned twenty-years-
old and juvenile court lost jurisdiction over the child.  Id. 
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (2006). 
93. In re R.A., 2011 ND 119, ¶ 4, 799 N.W.2d 332, 334 (citing In re A.R., 2010 ND 84, ¶ 5, 
781 N.W.2d 644, 647). 
94. Id. 
95. In re A.E., 1997 ND 9, ¶ 3, 559 N.W.2d 215, 216. 
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IV. BLENDED SENTENCING – THE MODERN TREND 
The modern trend in states is to utilize some form of blended 
sentencing, which grants judges expanded sentencing authority.96  “Blended 
sentencing emerged during a period of steadily increasing violent juvenile 
crime as a compromise between those who wanted to emphasize public 
safety, punishment, and accountability of juvenile offenders and those who 
wanted to maintain or strengthen the traditional juvenile justice system.”97  
Blended sentencing deals with a juvenile offender’s ultimate disposition 
and allows a juvenile court to sentence juvenile offenders to juvenile or 
adult criminal sanctions or both.98 
Blended sentencing statutes operate in two different respects.  In 
juvenile blended sentencing, a juvenile court can impose both a juvenile 
and criminal sanction, but the juvenile’s behavior and compliance 
determine which sentence will be imposed.99  If the juvenile abides by the 
juvenile sentence then he or she will remain in the juvenile justice 
system.100  However, if the juvenile offender does not comply with the 
juvenile sentence, the criminal sentence that was previously given may take 
effect.101  Although the policies underlying blended sentencing were 
devised to incarcerate juvenile offenders adjudicated of committing violent 
crimes for a longer period of time, there may be certain situations where 
juveniles serve less time.102 
Criminal blended sentencing laws represent the second type of blended 
sentencing statutes.103  This gives criminal courts the opportunity to 
sentence juvenile offenders to dispositions generally reserved to juvenile 
courts, even though they have been transferred to adult court.104  Although 
the potential for a juvenile disposition is conditioned upon the offender’s 
 
96. NAT’L CTR FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 2.  At the end of 1995, there were 
sixteen states with blended sentencing statutes in place, but by the end of 2004, at least twenty-six 
states had implemented some form of blended sentencing statute.  FRED CHEESMAN, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, A DECADE OF NCSC RESEARCH ON BLENDED SENTENCING OF JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS:  WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT “WHO GETS A SECOND CHANCE?” 113 (2011), 
available at http://www ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/Special-
Programs/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/Cheesman.ashx. 
97. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113. 
98. Id. 
99. See Polachek, supra note 16, at 1173 (discussing the operation of blended sentencing 
statutes). 
100. Id.  “Blended sentencing offers juvenile offenders a last chance within the juvenile 
system by providing an incentive to respond to treatment in order to avoid the consequences of an 
adult sentence.”  CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113 (citations omitted). 
101. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1173. 
102. Moore, supra note 8, 131. 
103. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113. 
104. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1173. 
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cooperative behavior, there is a belief that criminal blended sentencing is 
more lenient.105 
A. MODELS OF BLENDED SENTENCING 
Blended sentencing authority can be exclusive, inclusive, or 
contiguous.106  In an exclusive blended sentencing model a judge has the 
discretion to impose either a juvenile or an adult sentence.107  That sentence 
is made effective immediately.108  The inclusive blended sentencing model 
allows a judge to “impose both a juvenile and an adult sanction.”109  
Generally, the adult sentence would remain suspended, unless the juvenile 
committed a subsequent violation.110  The last type is called the contiguous 
blended sentencing model.111  This model allows a juvenile court judge to 
impose a sentence that begins in the juvenile system, but extends beyond 
the maximum age of the extended juvenile court jurisdiction.112  When the 
maximum age is reached the offender would be transferred to an adult 
correctional system to finish out the imposed sentence.113 
There are five different models of blended sentencing that have 
emerged from recent legislation.114  These different models are juvenile-
exclusive blend, juvenile-inclusive blend, juvenile contiguous blend 
criminal-exclusive blend, and criminal-inclusive blend.115  In the first three 
varieties, the juvenile court “retains responsibility for adjudicating the 
 
105. Id. at 1174.  This belief is due to the fact that even though a youth has been transferred 
to adult court they may receive a juvenile disposition, which is arguably more rehabilitative than 
punitive in nature.  Id. 








114. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO 
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 11-14 (1996).  There is also a New York Model, but it 
will not be discussed in detail.  The New York Model is used primarily for adolescents in criminal 
court.  It allows the criminal sentence to be suspended while the juvenile participates in an 
alternative to an incarceration program.  Successful juveniles avoid a criminal sentence, upon 
successful completion of the alternative.  Megan M. Sulok, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile 
Prosecutions:  To Revoke or Not to Revoke, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 215, 243 (2007). 
115. Moore, supra note 8, at 131; see also CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114 (identifying the 
five different varieties of blended sentencing used across the United States). 
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case.”116  The second two varieties leave responsibility with the criminal 
court.117 
1. Juvenile-Exclusive Blend Sentencing 
The juvenile-exclusive blend allows a juvenile court to impose either a 
juvenile or adult sentence.118  At the outset, the juvenile court retains 
original jurisdiction, but upon adjudication or a finding of guilt, the juvenile 
court judge may impose either a juvenile or adult sentence.119  When an 
adult sentence is imposed, the juvenile can be sentenced to the adult 
mandatory for the convicted offense.120  However, when the offender is 
given a juvenile sentence, the offender may be sentenced to two years or 
until the age of 18, whichever is longer.121  New Mexico,122 
Massachusetts,123 and Michigan124 utilize this type of blended 
sentencing.125 
2. Juvenile-Inclusive Blend Sentencing 
The juvenile-inclusive blend126 allows the juvenile court judge to 
impose both a juvenile and adult sentence.127  Generally, the adult sentence 
is suspended.128  This blended sentencing option “provide[s] a viable 
dispositional option for juvenile court judges facing juveniles who have 
committed serious or repeat offenses and to give juveniles one last chance 
at success in the juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanctions as a 
 
116. Moore, supra note 8, at 131.  At the end of 1997, nine of the twenty states with blended 
sentencing authority left the responsibility of sentencing with the juvenile judge.  CHEESMAN, 
supra note 96, at 114. 
117. Moore, supra note 8, 131.  There were nine states that placed authority in criminal court 
judges when exercising blended sentencing following a juvenile’s conviction.  CHEESMAN, supra 
note 96, at 114.  Blended-sentencing options were given to both juvenile and criminal court judges 
in Colorado and Michigan.  Id. 
118. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
119. Moore, supra note 8, at 132. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-2-20, -23 (2011). 
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (2008). 
124. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18(1)(m) (West 2012). 
125. RICHARD E. REDDING & JAMES C. HOWELL, BLENDED SENTENCING IN AMERICAN 
JUVENILE COURTS, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145, 146, 149, tbl.4.3 (Jeffery 
Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000). 
126. Normally, the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction over the juvenile offender until they 
reach the age of 21. Moore, supra note 8, at 133. 
127. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
128. Id.  The adult sentence is suspended, unless the juvenile offender violates the 
dispositional order or commits a new offense.  Moore, supra note 8, at 133. 
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disincentive.”129  Illinois,130 Kansas,131 South Dakota,132 Minnesota,133 
Alaska,134 Arkansas,135 Connecticut,136 Michigan,137 Montana,138 
Vermont,139 and Ohio140 have adopted the juvenile inclusive blend 
sentencing.141 
3. Juvenile Contiguous Blend Sentencing 
The states following the juvenile contiguous blended sentencing model 
impose a juvenile sentence; however, this juvenile sentence extends beyond 
the age of the states EJJ.142  When the age of extended jurisdiction is 
reached, the juvenile court decides whether or not the juvenile offender 
should serve the remainder of the sentence in an adult correctional 
institute.143  Texas,144 Massachusetts,145 Rhode Island,146 Colorado,147 and 
South Carolina148 have enacted statutes following the juvenile contiguous 
blended sentencing.149 
4. Criminal-Exclusive Blend Sentencing 
In criminal-exclusive blended sentencing a criminal court can choose 
to impose either an adult or juvenile sentence.150  Generally, if an adult 
court determines a juvenile sentence is appropriate then the juvenile 
offender is adjudicated delinquent and committed to a juvenile facility.151  
 
129. Id. at 132-33 (quoting PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.,OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT CRIME (1996)). 
130. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-810 (West Supp. 2012). 
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347 (Supp. 2011). 
132. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (West Supp. 2012). 
133. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 (2012).  Blended sentencing in Minnesota is referred to as 
Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction or EJJ.  Moore, supra note 8, at 132-33. 
134. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.065 (West 2007). 
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Supp. 2009), -506 (2008). 
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-133c (West Supp. 2009). 
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18 (West 2012). 
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (2012). 
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5201- 5293 (West Supp. 2011). 
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.121, 2152.13, 2152.14 (West 2012). 
141. Moore, supra note 8, at 132-33. 
142. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
143. Id. 
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (Supp. 2012). 
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (2008). 
146. R.I. GEN LAWS § 14-1-7.3 (Supp. 2011). 
147. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2-601, 19-2-907 to -908, 19-2-910 to -911 (2012). 
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1210 (2010). 
149. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
150. Id. 
151. Moore, supra note 8, at 134. 
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On the other hand, if the adult court imposes an adult sentence then the 
offender is sentenced as an adult and transferred to a correctional facility.152  
Virginia,153 West Virginia,154 Colorado,155 Florida,156 California,157 
Idaho,158 Michigan,159 and Oklahoma160 utilize the criminal-exclusive 
blended sentencing model.161 
5. Criminal-Inclusive Blend Sentencing 
The last type of blended sentencing allows a criminal court to sentence 
a juvenile offender to both an adult and a juvenile sentence.162  However, 
the adult sentence is typically suspended.163  Criminal-inclusive blended 
sentencing is similar to juvenile-inclusive blended sentencing.164  The only 
difference is that in criminal-inclusive blended sentencing adult courts 
retain jurisdiction over the offender, rather than the juvenile court.165  
Virginia,166 Florida,167 Arkansas,168 Michigan,169 and Iowa170 are the five 
states that utilize the criminal-inclusive blended sentencing model.171 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
A fundamental principal of juvenile law is the ability to tailor the 
disposition for the particular child based on the circumstances of the offense 
and the child’s situation.172  Juvenile courts are often asked to strike a 
balance between providing for the care and rehabilitation of the child and 
 
152. Id. 
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (2010). 
154. W. VA. CODE § 25-4-6 (2002). 
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-907 (2012). 
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.56, .565 (2012). 
157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.01 (Deering Supp. 2012). 
158. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-509 (2004). 
159. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712A.18(1)(m)-712A.18g (West 2012). 
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 2-2-401 to 2-2-403 (2009). 
161. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Moore, supra note 8, at 135. 
165. Id. 
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (2010). 
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.565 (2012). 
168. ARK CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Supp. 2012). 
169. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18(1)(m) (West 2012). 
170. IOWA CODE § 907.3A (2012). 
171. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114. 
172. State ex rel. D.R., 51 So. 3d 121, 124 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 27-20-31 (2006) (“[T]he court may make any of the following orders of disposition best suited 
to the child’s treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare . . . .”). 
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the protection of the public.173  These hallmarks of juvenile justice are 
difficult to accomplish under a framework that gives little or no 
consideration to the specific circumstances of a case or child. 
A. AN IMPERFECT SYSTEM 
Under North Dakota’s current transfer statute, little discretion is left to 
the court or the parties in determining what type of disposition is the most 
appropriate or effective in a particular case.174  For those offenses 
qualifying for automatic transfer, the prosecutor has discretion to determine 
the offense that is charged, which in turn determines if the case is 
prosecuted in juvenile or adult court.175  In this situation, prosecutors are 
expected to see into the future to determine if an adult or juvenile 
disposition is most appropriate.  Oftentimes, if a child has committed a 
serious, violent offense, but his juvenile court record is minimal or 
nonexistent, the determination of whether the case should be transferred to 
adult court is difficult. 
Additionally, the discretionary transfer is difficult to obtain in cases 
where the child has no prior involvement with juvenile court.  The 
discretionary transfer requires a finding that the child is not amenable to 
treatment or rehabilitation in juvenile court.176  This element is often shown 
through the child’s prior juvenile court programs and his level of success in 
those programs.177  For example, if a child is charged with involuntary 
manslaughter, but has no prior record in juvenile court, that case may not 
meet the criteria for transfer to adult court. 
B. AN UNFAIR RESOLUTION 
Whether a child is prosecuted as an adult or juvenile poses significant 
differences for both the child and the safety of the public.  For example, if a 
child fourteen years or older is charged with gross sexual imposition by 
 
173. See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 765 (Md. App. 1970) (“[T]he juvenile court is to make 
disposition so as to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical 
development of the child; by a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation ‘consistent with 
the protection of the public interest.”). 
174. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 2011).  This is particularly true for an 
automatic transfer as the statute provides that “the court before hearing the petition on its merits 
shall transfer the offense . . . [if] there is probable cause to believe the child committed the alleged 
delinquent act.”  Id. § 27-20-34(1) (emphasis added).  However, even under a discretionary 
transfer, the court must also make certain findings, such as if the child is amenable to treatment or 
rehabilitation through juvenile programs.  Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c).  This requirement is often difficult 
to prove if the child has no prior involvement with juvenile court programs. 
175. See id. § 27-20-34(1). 
176. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(b). 
177. Id. § 27-20-34(3). 
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force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, 
the offense would transfer to adult court upon a finding of probable 
cause.178  This offense imposes a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty 
years’ imprisonment with probation supervision to follow the 
incarceration.179  In addition to the sentence, the child would also be 
required to comply with lifetime registration as a sex offender.180 
Conversely, if the child was charged with a lesser offense in an effort 
to avoid the mandatory transfer provision, he or she would likely face a 
much less significant disposition than that imposed in adult court.  In 
juvenile court, the maximum sentence imposed on any delinquency offense 
is twelve months.181  This order can be extended in increments of twelve 
months upon a finding that the extension is necessary for the treatment or 
rehabilitation of the child.182  However, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a 
child terminates on the child’s twentieth birthday.183 
This example exhibits the drastic differences between each disposition 
that could be imposed.  Neither disposition may be appropriate for the 
offender or the public.  The adult sentence creates the risk that the child 
may be over-punished for the offense charged.  However, the juvenile 
disposition may not provide for sufficient time to adequately treat and 
rehabilitate the child and protect the public from a serious, violent offender. 
C. STRIKING A FAIR BALANCE 
Presently, the North Dakota Legislature is contemplating a method of 
blended sentencing for juvenile offenders.184  Blended sentencing would 
provide a middle ground between the grave sanctions of adult court and the 
limited jurisdiction of juvenile court.185  The proposed legislation provides a 
juvenile with “one last chance” in juvenile court and an opportunity to 
 
178. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(b).  The offense of Gross Sexual Imposition by force or by threat of 
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping is classified as a class AA felony.  N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(3)(a) (2012). 
179. Id. § 12.1-20-03(3)(a).  The court may deviate from this sentence if it finds that there is 
manifest injustice in the sentence and the defendant has accepted responsibility for the offense.  
Id. 
180. Id. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a), (8)(c). 
181. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36(2) (Supp. 2011). 
182. Id. § 27-20-36(2)(a). 
183. Id. § 27-20-36(6). 
184. S.B. 2035, 63d Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2013). 
185. CHEESMAN, supra  note 96, at 113 (explaining that blended sentencing serves “as a 
compromise between those who wanted to emphasize public safety, punishment, and 
accountability of juvenile offenders and those who wanted to maintain or strengthen the traditional 
juvenile justice system”). 
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comply with a juvenile sentence before an adult sentence could be 
imposed.186 
The proposed legislation is a juvenile-inclusive model.187  This would 
allow the juvenile court judge to impose a juvenile sentence and an adult 
sentence, with the latter being stayed or suspended.188  So long as the child 
complies with the conditions of the juvenile sentence, the adult sentence is 
never imposed.  Conversely, if the child fails to comply with the juvenile 
conditions, that sentence can be revoked and the adult sentence imposed, at 
the discretion of the juvenile court judge.  Even though the child is initially 
sentenced as a juvenile, the child would receive all of the adult criminal 
procedural safeguards, such as the right to a jury trial. 
Research shows adolescent brains do not fully develop until about the 
age of twenty-five.189  As a result, trends in juvenile justice legislation 
shows that transfer statutes are being modified to give more discretion to 
juvenile court judges to determine the most appropriate disposition.190  On 
the other hand, greater discretion presents the risk of potential bias in 
decision making.191 
Transferring a child to adult court should be used as a last resort.  
Research suggests that prosecuting youth in the adult system results in a 
higher recidivism rate and an increase cost to the government.  The 
proposed legislation removes all of the mandatory transfers to adult court, 
except for murder and attempted murder, and places those offenses under 
extended juvenile jurisdiction. 
The transfer of a case to adult court or blended sentencing should be 
used on an infrequent basis.  However, the infrequency of its usage does not 
diminish the importance of this sentencing alternative.  The use of blended 
sentencing in those few cases would make a substantial difference for both 
the child and the safety of society. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
North Dakota’s juvenile justice system has adopted the mission of 
“balanced and restorative justice.”192  The intent of this approach is to 
 
186. See id. (reporting that blended sentencing gives a child an incentive to comply with 
treatment in juvenile court in order to avoid the imposition of the adult sentence). 
187. S.B. 2035, 63d Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2013). 
188. Id. 
189. SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2001-2011, at 3 (2012). 
190. Id. at 5. 
191. Cheesman supra note 96, at 116 (suggesting objective risk-and-needs assessments be 
used to assist in identifying the most appropriate candidates for blended sentencing). 
192. NORTH DAKOTA JUVENILE COURT BEST PRACTICES MANUAL 1.1. 
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balance the offenders’ need for treatment and rehabilitation with the safety 
of the community.193  To appropriately strike this balance, the juvenile 
justice system must be flexible and must carefully consider each particular 
situation. 
The adoption of a blended sentencing system would provide for 
rehabilitation and accountability for the child, and protect the public from 
serious, violent offenders that have failed in the juvenile justice system.  If 
passed, S.B. 2035 would give juvenile offenders one last chance to 
participate in appropriate juvenile programs before facing the more serious 
consequences of an adult court sentence.  Unlike our current law, blended 
sentencing would allow the juvenile justice professionals to wait and see 
which disposition is most effective and appropriate for the child.  The 
implementation of such approach would provide a more fair result by 
balancing the interests of the child and society. 
 
193. Id. 
